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SAVING THE CONSTITUTION: LINCOLN, 
SECESSION, AND THE PRICE OF UNION 
Craig S. Lerner* 
LINCOLN'S CONSTITUTION. B y  Daniel Farber. Chicago: Universit y of 
Chicago Press. 2003. Pp. ix, 240. $27.50. 
The year is 1860. After failing to obtain, as he had expected, the 
Democratic Part y nomination for President at its Charleston 
convention, Stephen Douglas abandons his candidac y. In the ensuing 
election, Democrat John C. Breckinridge of Kentuck y edges 
Republican Abraham Lincoln.1 The official platform of the 
Democratic Part y includes endorsement of the Dred Scott decision, 
slaver y's expansion in the federal territories, rigorous enforcement of 
the Fugitive Slave Act, and elimination of the tariff. Abolitionists in 
New England are inconsolable. For several years, Henry Llo yd 
Garrison had advocated Northern secession, denouncing the 
Constitution as a "union with slaveholders," and "a covenant with 
death and an agreement with Hell."2 Funded b y  industrialists who see 
* Associate Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. A.B. 1987, 
Harvard; M.A. 1990, University of Chicago; J.D. 1994, Harvard. - Ed. The author thanks 
Peter Hansen, John Harper, Renee Lettow Lerner, Nelson Lund, Daniel Polsby, and Nancy 
Tardy for helpful comments. 
1. Douglas had been expected to receive the Democratic Party's nomination for 
president in 1860, but at the convention in Charleston southerners revolted and eventually 
rallied around Breckinridge instead. See Peter Knupfer, James Buchanan, the Election of 
1860, and the Demise of Jacksonian Politics, in JAMES BUCHANAN AND THE POLITICAL 
CRISIS OF THE 1850s (Michael J. Birkner ed., 1996). Douglas's decision to run as a 
"Northern Democrat" splintered the anti-Lincoln vote. See Dep't of the Interior, Map of the 
Presidential Election of 1860, http://teachpol.tcnj.edu/amer_pol_hist/thumbnail189.html (last 
visited June 30, 2004). In the actual tally, Lincoln won 180 electoral votes (40% of popular 
vote), Breckinridge 72 (18%), Constitutional Union candidate John Bell 39 (12%), and 
Douglas 12 (30% ). Had Douglas not run, Breckinridge would likely have won Virginia (15 
electoral votes), Kentucky (12) and Tennessee (12), all of which were taken by John Bell. He 
would also have won the two states taken by Douglas, Missouri (9) and Delaware (3), and 
two of the states claimed by Lincoln, California (4) and Oregon (3). The most far-fetched 
aspect of this hypothetical world is that Breckinridge wins Pennsylvania. In the actual 
results, Lincoln won 268,030 votes to Breckinridge's 178,871. Even if we give all of Douglas's 
votes (16,765) to Breckinridge, he would still trail by a substantial margin. But assuming that 
New Yorker William Seward, who had been the original front-runner for the Republican 
nomination, had declined to throw his zealous support behind Lincoln (which he did after 
being promised a cabinet position), then Lincoln's showing in the mid-Atlantic region would 
have been considerably impaired. Voila: Breckinridge pulls out a razor-thin victory in 
Pennsylvania, claiming its 27 votes. The final electoral tally: Breckinridge 157, Lincoln 153. 
2. For a sample of Garrison's incendiary rhetoric, see WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON, 
DISUNION (1855), http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=567. 
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no advantage in remaining in a tariff-free Union, Garrison rallies 
abolitionists in Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, 
Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New York, and the seven states 
formally secede from the Union. President Breckinridge convenes a 
Special Session of Congress on July 4, 1861, and proclaims: "The 
States have their status in the Union, and the y have no other legal 
status. If they break from us, they can onl y do so against law and by 
revolution."3 Before rece 1v mg authorization from Congress, 
Breckinridge calls up 75,000 troops and promises an invasion of New 
England. Also without congressional approval, Breckinridge suspends 
habeas corpus in "border states" like Pennsylvania and Delaware, 
summaril y dispatching hundreds of citizens to prison. 
In this hypothetical world, who would we sa y is in the right - the 
seceding states or the President? Would preserving the Union justify 
the slaughter of over 600,000 men, an assault on civil liberties, the 
devastation of the national economy, and the subjugation of one 
region of America to rule by the other for over a decade? If President 
Breckinridge had, on a blood-soaked battlefield, touted the war as a 
struggle to ensure "that government of the people, by the people, for 
the people shall not perish from the earth," would we be persuaded, or 
would we construe in such words a poetic inversion of the truth? 
It is difficult for Americans today to take seriousl y the legal claims 
in favor of a right of secession. The cause of secession in 1860 became 
commingled with a defense of slavery, and our repugnance for that 
institution carries over into our rejection of secession. Furthermore, 
there is a sense among many Americans that our country has, on 
balance, had a salutary influence on global affairs. Any suggestion that 
we might have been better off as separate nations prompts a lecture 
on the United States' role in the twentieth century as an agent of 
freedom and the inevitable lament that, had America not been united, 
Germany would have won World War II. The argument, however 
flawed, 4 often suffices to cut short any argument over the merits of 
secession and Union. 
As Daniel Farber5 writes in Lincoln's Constitution, "we must . . .  
put aside our revulsion against the Confederacy's proslavery aims. 
Whether the Constitution provides states with an exit option does not 
3. President Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 
1861), http://www.founding.com/library/lbody.cfm?id=547&parent=63 [hereinafter Lincoln, 
Message to Congress]. 
4. A divided America might not have entered, or perhaps would have only partially 
entered, World War I. Absent American intervention, the warring parties might have sought 
a negotiated truce. And without the punitive Treaty of Versailles, perhaps one could say: no 
Nazism, no World War II, no Holocaust, etc. 
5. Sho Sato Professor of Law, University of California-Berkely and Henry J. Fletcher 
Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. 
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depend on the state's motivation[]" (p. 81). Farber's book (and this 
Review) are framed around two broad issues: First, did the South have 
the right - either under the Constitution or some higher law - to 
secede; or, as Lincoln argued, is "perpetuit y . . .  implied . . .  in the 
fundamental law of all national governments"?6 Second, were 
Lincoln's actions to preserve the Union consistent with the 
Constitution; or did he exceed the powers delegated to him as the 
chief executive? From a reviewer's point of view, Lincoln's 
Constitution is a frustrating book: Farber is generall y balanced in his 
presentation of conflicting views, and measured and fair in his 
conclusions. How much easier m y  task would be if Farber had chosen 
sides, and declared himself in the camp of those who venerate Lincoln7 
or abhor him.8 
Farber's book is, nonetheless, unmistakabl y the work of a law 
professor and not a historian. Farber is less interested in resolving 
historical disputes than in anal yzing the legal questions that 
confronted Lincoln - principall y of secession and civil liberties. 
Often, however, the legal questions are enmeshed in historical 
disputes, and in these instances Farber t ypicall y supplies citations to 
secondar y literature for his controversial historical claims. And even 
this much is sometimes missing. Farber mentions in passing that 
"[General] Sherman's reputation [for brutalit y] is exaggerated" (p. 
23), but he supplies no footnote to support a claim that would be 
received in certain quarters in Atlanta with astonishment.9 Yet 
whatever fascination the Civil War ma y hold for us as citizens and 
historians, as law yers there is a nagging sense of: so what? It has long 
since been decided that the states do not have a right to secede; 10 and 
6. See First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4 1861), http://www.founding.com/library/lbody. 
cfm?id=327&parent=63 [hereinafter, Lincoln First Inaugural). 
7. See, e.g., HARRY V. JAFFA, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND 
THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR (2000). 
8. See, e.g., THOMAS J. DILORENZO, THE REAL LINCOLN: A NEW LOOK AT ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN, HIS AGENDA AND AN UNNECESSARY WAR (2002). 
9. Sherman himself might have been surprised by Farber's judgment: In his official 
report on the March to the Sea, Sherman calculated the total damage as $100,000,000, an 
astronomical sum for 1864, and of which, by Sherman's own estimate, only 20% achieved 
any military advantage for the Union; the remainder was "simple waste and destruction." 
RICHARD WHEELER, SHERMAN'S MARCH 131 (1978) (quoting Sherman's official report on 
the march). Farber also contends that, with respect to Lincoln, "charges [of dictatorship) 
were exaggerated," p. 20, and that "[r]oughly five percent of the military trials [he approved) 
took place in uncontested territory" in the North, p. 164. In reaching these conclusions, 
Farber seems to rely upon Mark Neely's fascinating work on the subject. MARK E. NEELY 
JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1991). 
10. See, e.g., Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 726 (1868) ("When, therefore, Texas became 
one of the United States, she entered into an indissoluble relation. All the obligations of 
perpetual union, and all the guaranties of republican government in the Union, attached at 
once to the State. The act which consummated her admission into the Union was something 
more than a compact; it was the incorporation of a new member into the political body. And 
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whatever Lincoln's excesses as President, what's done is done. 
Farber's sensible response is that the issue of secession, while in one 
sense of antiquarian interest, still compels us to reflect upon the 
nature of executive power in times of crisis and to consider whether 
there are legitimate grounds to compel state participation in our 
federal government. 
Lincoln's Constitution is an admirable summar y of man y of the 
constitutional arguments associated with Lincoln's name. Whether, 
under the Constitution, the states have a right to secede, or, 
correlativel y, whether the National Government has the right to use 
force to prevent the dissolution of the Union are interesting questions. 
More provocative, however, are the moral and philosophical issues 
that lie behind the legal debate: when one people should be free to set 
up a new government, even at the expense of an existing one; and 
when, conversel y, a nation should acquiesce in its dismemberment 
rather than compel a segment of the population to remain against its 
wishes. In other words, even i f  the Constitution ratified in 1789 was 
intended to foreclose a right of secession, might there be 
circumstances in which a President should allow a section of the 
nation, no longer linked b y  interest and opinion to the rest, to simpl y 
leave in peace? In the earl y da ys of the American republic, this 
question was bandied about constantl y in American political 
discourse ;  since the Civil War, however, it has utterl y disappeared. 
This fact testifies to the extent to which the regime that has emerged 
from Lincoln's presidenc y is not quite the one that entered it; and 
shows how an almost -m ystic devotion to the nation's territorial 
integrit y has numbed critical reflections on the moral and 
philosophical premises that underlie the modern American regime's 
refusal to countenance a right of secession. 
I. A RIGHT OF SECESSION? 
From the earliest da ys of the republic, Americans debated whether 
the states had the right to nullify federal laws or, more dramaticall y, 
secede from the Union.11 Although Farber's account suggests that 
it was final."). 
11. One commentator has noted: 
In the first half of the nineteenth century, Northerners and Southerners alike manipulated 
state sovereignty principles to serve their immediate political objectives. When the War of 
1812 threatened New England's shipping and commercial interests, New England Federalists 
called the Hartford Convention to consider seriously the wisdom of secession. Twenty years 
later, when the "Abominable Tariff' of 1832 was enacted, South Carolinians preached John 
C. Calhoun's doctrine of nullification. In another twenty years, radical northern abolitionists 
embraced nullification principles in order to defeat the operation of the Fugitive Slave Act 
of 1850. 
Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 61, 91 n.160 (1989). For a sketch of secession and nullification movements in American 
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secessionism was a southern phenomenon, 12 the rall ying cr y was at 
various times sounded throughout the nation. A biographer of John 
Calhoun suggests a delicious iron y - that the young Calhoun, 
destined to become the leader of southern nullification movements, 
first heard secessionist arguments from the Reverend Timoth y 
Dwight, the arch-Federalist president of Yale College, during 
Jefferson's presidenc y.13 With Virginians claiming the Presidenc y in 
the earl y nineteenth centur y, an embittered New England seized upon 
various causes to threaten secession, culminating in the Hartford 
Convention of 1815.14 Soon the southerners would raise the banner of 
secession, first over tariffs designed to protect northern manufacturers 
at the expense of southern consumers, and eventuall y over the 
congeries of issues that clustered around slaver y (e.g. , the enforcement 
of the Fugitive Slave Act, the use of the mails to spread abolitionist 
literature, and the expansion of slavery into the territories).15 
In his anal ysis of secession, Farber follows a roughl y chronological 
approach. He first considers whether the states were sovereign 
political entities prior to the ratification of the Constitution (pp. 26-
44 ), then turns to the development, in the earl y years of the republic, 
of the doctrine of state nullification. This doctrine prefigured the full­
blown secession movements of the mid-nineteenth centur y (pp. 45-69). 
Farber concludes with the question of secession proper, considering it 
first as a constitutional right (pp. 70-91), and then as a right of 
rebellion (pp. 92-114). 
history, including Northern movements, see Calvin R. Massey, The Locus of Sovereignty: 
Judicial Review, Legislative Supremacy, and Federalism in the Constitutional Traditions of 
Canada and the United States, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1242-54. 
12. Farber begins his history of secession movements, pp. 8-25, with the Wilmot Proviso 
debate in 1849, thus glossing over earlier New England secession movements. Although 
Farber acknowledges in a footnote that northern secession movements arose "[a]t various 
times in the nineteenth century," p. 215 n.27, in the text he treats secession as an exclusively 
southern phenomenon, see, e.g., p. 21 ("Since 1800, Southerners had been arguing that the 
states had the ultimate sovereign right to interpret the Constitution."). Others have noted 
New England's flirtations with secession: 
Never mind that New England's law-abiding statesmen retreated into states' rights 
theorization after losing to Jefferson in 1800 or that they defied national law on a massive 
scale during the War of 1812, and took their section to the brink of secession in the Hartford 
Convention. New England rediscovered nationalism again in the 1820s when it suited its 
economic interests. 
R. Kent Newmyer, John Marshall, McCulloch v. Maryland, and the Southern States' Rights 
Tradition, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 875, 932 (2000). 
13. See MARGARET L. COIT, JOHN c. CALHOUN 28 (1950). 
14. See generally JAMES M. BANNER JR., TO THE HARTFORD CONVENTION: THE 
FEDERALISTS AND THE ORIGINS OF PARTY POLITICS IN MASSACHUSETTS 1780-1815 (1970). 
15. See generally DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS: 1848-1861 (Henry Steele 
Commager & Richard B. Morris eds., 1976). 
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The secession argument hinges in part on the claim that the states 
were independent sovereigns prior to ratifying the Constitution and 
that the y should therefore be able to reclaim their political 
independence. If, however, the states were never sovereign entities, 
then the case for the right to secede loses one of its fundamental 
premises. Thus did Lincoln argue in his Special Address to Congress 
on Jul y 4, 1861:  
Having never been States, either i n  substance o r  i n  name, outside o f  the 
Union, whence this magical omnipotence of "state rights," asserting a 
claim of power to lawfully destroy the Union itself? Much is said about 
the "sovereignty" of the States, but the word even is not in the national 
Constitution, nor, as is believed, in any of the State constitutions. What is 
a "sovereignty" in the political sense of the term? Would it be far wrong 
to define it "a political community without a political superior?" Tested 
by this, no one of our States, except Texas, ever was a sovereignty; and 
even Texas gave up the character on coming into the Union, by which act 
she acknowledged the Constitution of the United States and the laws and 
treaties of the United States made in pursuance of the Constitution to be 
for her the supreme law of the land.16 
The argument in Lincoln 's speech turns on a legal /political definition 
of sovereignt y and a historical account of the nature of the states prior 
to the Constitution's adoption. 
In assessing this definitional issue, Farber sifts through various 
ideas of sovereignt y, concluding that " [s]ince the Constitution never 
expressl y invokes the concept of sovereignt y, it is onl y indirectl y 
relevant to constitutional interpretation" (p. 44).  Although it is true 
that the Constitution never uses the word, the idea is embedded in 
Article VII: "The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall 
be sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution between the 
States so ratifying the Same."17 The Constitution thus contemplates the 
possibilit y that one, two, or three states would exist outside the Union. 
If so, would not each of those states be "a political communit y without 
a political superior"?18 
In his assessment of Lincoln's historical account, Farber marshals 
onl y a sampling of the evidence for and against before dismissing it as 
"ambiguous" (p. 44). He notes that on the one hand, the Declaration 
of Independence speaks of the colonies as "Free and Independent 
States" (p. 35) and, in this vein, Luther Martin argued at the 
16. Lincoln, Message to Congress, supra note 3. 
17. U.S. CONST. art. VII (emphasis added). 
18. In fact, the Constitution went into effect in March 1789, but North Carolina and 
Rhode Island did not ratify the Constitution until November 1789 and May 1790. For about 
a year, the United States treated these two states as separate sovereigns. 
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Constitutional Convention that the colonies were, after severing ties 
with England, "in a state of nature towards each other," each to be 
regarded as "separate sovereignties" (p. 33). On the other hand, in 
support of Lincoln's view, James Wilson argued at the Convention 
that the colonies, having separated from the Crown, "were 
independent, not Individually but Unitedly" (p. 35). 
Wilson's view, embraced later by Lincoln, is hardl y a frivolous 
position. After all, the former colonies that would later constitute the 
United States did not have a long histor y of independent existence as, 
for example, Norwa y did, when it seceded from Sweden in 1905. Yet 
each of the colonies could trace its origins back to separate grants 
from the Crown; each had evolved with relativel y distinctive 
indigenous political and cultural institutions; and there is considerable 
evidence that, at least for some Americans, allegiance to their local 
government trumped allegiance to the fledging union. 19 
In the historical debate on the status of the states, Farber 
ultimatel y positions himself in the middle - with Lincoln at the one 
extreme (den ying that the states were ever sovereign entities) and 
John Calhoun at the other extreme (insisting that the states were and 
remained sovereign entities. Farber aligns himself with the 
"transformational view" that the states once possessed sovereignt y but 
the Constitution created a "new sovereign .. . a new social compact 
among the American people as a whole" (p. 30). Stated in these terms, 
the middle position is so uncontroversial that it is uncertain who could 
quibble with it. Indeed, one question is whether Lincoln genuinel y 
believed the position set forth in the Jul y 4, 1861, Special Address to 
Congress, in which he so intransigentl y denied an y independent status 
to the states prior to the ratification of the Constitution. One 
possibilit y is that Lincoln's speeches are best understood in the 
19. Some states had more meaningful claims to an independent status than others. The 
state of Virginia, for example, declared its independence from the Crown in June 1776, and 
even enacted its own Bill of Rights and Constitution. Jefferson, in his Notes on Virginia, is 
generally dismissive of Virginia's 1776 Constitution. See Thomas Jefferson, Note on the State 
of Virginia, in THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 153-76 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1986), 
but his view was likely a minority one at the time. See K.R. CONSTANTINE GUTZMAN, OLD 
DOMINION, NEW REPUBLIC: MAKING VIRGINIA REPUBLICAN, 1776-1840, at 10-13 
(University of Virginia Doctoral Dissertation, 1999). The view that Virginia, as well as the 
other colonies, were independent sovereigns prior to the formation of the Union, was 
adopted by Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase thirty years later: 
In June, 1776, the convention of Virginia formally declared Virginia was a free, sovereign, 
and independent state; and on the 4th of July, 1776, following, the United States, in Congress 
assembled, declared the Thirteen United Colonies free and independent states; and that as 
such, they had full power to levy war, conclude peace, etc. I consider this as a declaration, 
not that the United Colonies jointly, in a collective capacity, were independent states, etc. 
but that each of them was a sovereign and independent state, that is, that each of them had a 
right to govern itself by its own authority, and its own laws, without any control from any 
other power upon earth. 
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 224 (1796). 
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context in which the y were delivered - that is, as political speeches, 
not law-review articles. His imperative need in the spring of 1861 was 
to rall y the Union to war; and in such endeavors political leaders need 
to make the most persuasive arguments, which ma y not be the 
intellectuall y soundest. 
Another possibilit y, suggested b y  Akhil Amar, is that Lincoln's 
background as a man of the frontier, a mongrel descendant of men 
and women of assorted states and federal territories, clouded his 
judgment and rendered him disposed to conclude that the "Union did 
indeed come first logicall y and chronologicall y" to the states.20 What at 
first glance seems problematic about Amar's suggestion is that persons 
with self-awareness eventuall y cast aside, to some extent, their own 
heritage in grasping at ultimate truths; and Lincoln was, in terms of 
self-awareness, off the charts.21 Then again, perhaps towering geniuses 
have blind spots that we lesser mortals are spared. As Alexander 
Stephens, Vice-President of the Confederac y and one-time friend of 
Lincoln, said of him: "The Union, with him, in sentiment rose to the 
sublimit y of a religious m ysticism."22 
B. From the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions to the Nullification 
Crisis 
In Chapter Three, Lincoln recedes from the scene, and Farber 
bustles the reader through a collection of debates in the earl y republic 
over the relative status of the states and the federal government. 
Farber here casts Madison, Hamilton, John Marshall, and Joseph 
Stor y on one side, defending the federal government; John Calhoun 
on the other side, asserting the prerogatives of the states; and 
Jefferson flitting here and there with no discernible compass to 
guide him. 23 
20. Akhil Reed Amar, The David C. Baum Lecture: Abraham Lincoln and the American 
Union, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1109, 1126. Amar elaborates: 
Id. 
[Lincoln's] forbears came from several states - Kentucky, Virginia, Pennsylvania, and 
possibly New England as well, though Lincoln was not quite sure. He himself had lived in 
three states - born in Kentucky, moving to Indiana at age seven, and then on to Illinois as a 
young man . . . . .  When we remember where Lincoln was quite literally coming from, it is 
easier to understand (whether or not we ultimately endorse) his repeated insistence that 
"[t]he Union is much older than the Constitution. " 
21. Consider his Lyceum Address of 1838, delivered when he was only 28 years old, on 
the amorality of ambition. Lincoln's speech is almost surely an oblique critique of the 
potential dangers men such as himself, men of "towering ambition," may pose to the 
established social order. 
22 . ALEXANDER STEPHENS, A CONSTITUTIONAL VIEW OF THE LATE WAR BETWEEN 
THE STATES (1868). 
23. As Madison delicately noted of his good friend, "Allowances also ought to be made 
for a habit in Mr. Jefferson as in others of great genius of expressing in strong and round 
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The Chapter opens with a discussion of the Kentuck y and Virginia 
Resolutions, drafted in protest to the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 
b y  Jefferson and Madison respectivel y  (pp. 45-50). Although both 
resolutions argued that states can evaluate for themselves the 
constitutionalit y of federal laws, Farber arg ues that the y fell short of 
asserting a right b y  an individual state to annul a federal law . The 
power asserted b y  the states in those Resolutions nonetheless proved 
irksome to federal courts, as Farber then shows (pp . 50-57). Led b y  
John Marshall2 4 and Joseph Stor y,25 courts asserted jurisdiction over 
the states whenever issues of federal law were raised, establishing a 
power that was probabl y implicit in the text of the Constitution26 and 
avowed b y  Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist.27 In this respect, the 
Supreme Court fulfilled the fears of the Anti-Federalists who argued 
that the Court would promote the growth of the national government 
b y  giving a sweeping interpretation to its enumerated powers.28 
Farber then turns to the nullification crisis of 1832, in which 
Calhoun renewed and extended the logic of the Kentuck y and 
Virginia Resolutions (pp. 57-62). In quarrels with President Jackson, 
John Calhoun argued that an individual state should be authorized to 
nullify a federal law. Calhoun's nullification theor y was self­
consciousl y offered as an improvement upon the Constitution, rather 
than the realization of its original understanding, b y  providing 
additional assurances against the t yrann y of the majorit y.29 Jackson's 
colorful response was to threaten to hang Calhoun from the nearest 
tree. Elder-statesman Madison supplied counterarguments of a more 
intellectuall y satisfying nature (pp. 62-69). Disma yed b y  the use 
Calhoun had made of his Virginia Resolutions, a repentant Madison 
terms, impressions of the moment." P. 68 (quoting a letter from James Madison to Nicholas 
Trist (May 1832)). 
24. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 285 (1821) (arguing that the Union "would be a 
mere shadow, that must disappoint all [the peoples'] hopes, unless invested with large 
portions of that sovereignty which belongs to independent States"). 
25. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 343 (1816) (arguing that the under the 
Constitution "the states are stripped of some of the highest attributes of sovereignty"). 
26. See U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2. 
27. See THE FEDERALIST No. 79 (Alexander Hamilton). 
28. See Essays of Brutus, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST 163 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1985) 
("[T]he judicial power of the United States will lean strongly in favor of the general 
government and will give such an explanation [of] the constitution, as will favor an extension 
of its jurisdiction."); cf McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. ( 4 Wheat) 316 (1819). 
29. Farber suggests a lineage for the states-rights views of Justice Thomas in the thought 
of antebellum states-rights thinkers such as Calhoun. Pp. 26-27. Calhoun's influence on 
modern legal thought can perhaps be more vividly seen among those thinkers and jurists 
who espouse a "living constitution," and specifically those who have argued that the original 
constitutional scheme insufficiently protects minority rights. See Lani Guinier, The Triumph 
of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. 
REv. 1077, 1140 & n.303 (drawing upon Calhoun's theory of concurrent majorities). 
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clarified that nothing in them was intended to support a 
"constitutional right in an individual State to arrest b y  force the 
operation of a law of the U.S." (pp. 69) .  Whatever the merits of 
nullification as a check against majorit y t yrann y, one can reject it as 
not contemplated b y  the Constitution: to permit an y state to refuse to 
enforce a federal law and yet to remain in the Union and draw all the 
usual benefits of statehood would transfigure the constitutional order, 
effectivel y  trumping the amendment process. 
Farber's account of the nullification debates is elucidating, but the 
significance of this Chapter within the book's larger argument is 
unclear. Of course, what Madison and Hamilton thought at the time 
the y participated in drafting the Constitution, as well as afterwards, is 
important. But insofar as we seek to recover the original 
understanding of the Constitution, their views need not be dispositive. 
One should consult the writings of Madison and Hamilton, Justice 
Scalia has argued, "not because the y were Framers . . . but rather 
because their writings, like those of other intelligent and informed 
people of the time, displa y how the text of the Constitution was 
originall y understood."30 
Yet one might wonder just how t ypical their views in fact were in 
1787. Indeed, Madison and Hamilton were relative outliers in their 
da y insofar as the y wished to dismantle the states and exalt the federal 
government. Madison, we should recall, proposed that Congress have 
the power to veto all state laws; and the Philadelphia Convention's 
rejection of this constitutional provision led Madison to despair at the 
final product in a somewhat mournful letter to Jefferson written 
immediatel y after the Convention. We law professors tend to indulge 
the habit of citing the writings of Madison and Hamilton (especiall y 
The Federalist) as if it were a conclusive interpretative source, when in 
realit y the median vote r in 1787 might well have diverged significantl y 
from the Constitution's nominal "fathers" as regards its meaning and 
intent. 31 
Indeed, it is striking that, whatever Madison's views on the issues, 
significant elements have clamored for nullification and even secession 
virtuall y from the republic's inception. In 1803, several representatives 
from New England declared that the y wanted out, appalled by  the 
Louisiana Purchase and fearful that it portended a reduction of their 
power in the Union. The most significant New England secession 
movement - in 1815 - resulted in a convention and a list of demands 
30. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW38 (1997). 
31. This point is suggested in Kevin Gutzman's review of Farber's book. See Kevin R.C. 
Gutzman, Book Review, L. & POL. BOOK REV., Jan. 2004, at http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/ 
lpbr/subpages/reviews/Farber10 4.htm. 
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on President Madison. 32 Some modern-da y observers, such as Farber, 
follow Lincoln33 and tend to suggest that Calhoun was the nefarious 
popularizer of the secession hoax, when the fact is that secessionists 
are as old as the republic itself. 
Furthermore, there is a common assumption that secessionists 
were on the margins, whereas the mainstream was reflected in the 
thought of people like Joseph Stor y, whose 1830 Commentaries on the 
Constitution downpla yed the status of the states and foreclosed a right 
of secession.3 4 But this ma y simpl y be a case of winners writing the 
histories, for a once-respected, but now largel y forgotten, constitu­
tional treatise in 1825 asserted that the states had the right to secede.35 
Furthermore, our nation's most renowned foreign observer, Alexis de 
Tocqueville, who visited America in 1825, seemed to lend credence to 
the secessionist argument: "If toda y one of these same states wanted 
to withdraw its name from the contract, it would be quite difficult to 
prove that it could not do so. To combat it, the federal government 
would have no evident support in either force or right." 36 
32. Report of the Hartford Convention (1815), in THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: PRIMARY 
SOURCES 447-57 (Bruce Fronhnen ed., 2002). 
33. Lincoln clearly had Calhoun in mind when he launched into an attack on architects 
of secession theory in his Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861). 
Secessionists, Lincoln wrote, "invented an ingenious sophism, which, if conceded, was 
followed by perfectly logical steps, through all the incidents, to the complete destruction of 
the Union." Id. 
34. Story argued: 
Whatever, then, may be the theories of ingenious men on the subject, it is historically true, 
that before the declaration of independence these colonies were not, in any absolute sense, 
sovereign states; that that event did not find them or make them such; but that at the 
moment of their separation they were under the dominion of a superior controlling national 
government, whose powers were vested in and exercised by the general congress with the 
consent of the people of all the states. 
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 202 
(1830); see also H. Jefferson Powell, Joseph Story's Commentaries on the Constitution: A 
Belated Review, 94 YALE L.J. 1285, 1303-06 (1985) (summarizing Story's criticisms of 
nullification and secession arguments). 
35. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 211-17 (1825), available at http://www.constitution.org/wr/rawle_32.htm (arguing 
that if "the people of a state should determine to retire from the Union," the national 
government could not prevent them). 
36. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 354 (Harvey c. Mansfield & 
Delba Winthrop trans., 2000). The famous English lawyer Lord Brougham similarly wrote: 
There is not, as with us, a government only and its subjects to be regarded; but a number of 
Governments, of States having a separate and substantive, and even independent 
existence . . . . It is plainly impossible to consider the Constitution which professes to govern 
this Union, this Federacy of States, as anything other than a treaty. 
HENRY LORD BROUGHAM, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 336 (2d ed. 1849), quoted in Donald 
W. Livingston, The Secession Tradition in America, in SECESSION, STATE & LIBERTY 13 
(David Gordon ed., 2002). 
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C. Secession as a Constitutional Right 
(Vol. 102:1263 
In Chapt er Four, Farb er turns to th e qu estion of s ec ession prop er, 
which h e  not es "is actuall y a tough er l egal issu e than nullification . . . .  
Compar ed with nullification, s ec essionism r equir es l ess distortion of 
th e constitutional structur e - it m er el y  adds an exit option" (p. 70). 
Various constitutions have affirm ed, som e dising enuousl y, th e 
propri et y  of s ec ession. Th e Constitution of th e U.S.S.R., for exampl e, 
provid ed that " [ e]ach Union R epublic shall r etain th e right fr eel y  to 
s ec ed e  from th e USSR. "37 Th e propos ed Constitution of th e Europ ean 
Union lik ewis e provid es that " [a]n y M emb er Stat e ma y d ecid e to 
withdraw from th e Europ ean Union in accordanc e with its own 
constitutional r equirements."38 A comm ent on this s ection not es that 
"man y [draft ers] consid er that it is possibl e to withdraw ev en in th e 
abs enc e of a sp ecific provision to that effect. "39 Ind eed, th e draft ers of 
th e Confed erat e Constitution d elib erat el y  omitt ed an y r efer enc e to a 
right of s ec ession b ecaus e its inclusion might suggest that th e right was 
not implicit in th e Unit ed Stat es Constitution. 40 
Although th e text of th e U.S. Constitution is sil ent on th e qu estion 
of a stat e's right to s eced e, Farb er argu es that it "looks much mor e 
lik e an organic docum ent . . .  than a tr eat y" (p. 81). Although tru e, th e 
qu estion r emains: which t extual provisions so thoroughl y evisc erat e 
th e sov er eignt y of th e stat es that th ey ar e no long er entitl ed to r e­
claim th eir sov er eignt y? Farb er not es that th e Constitution's pr eambl e 
sp eaks of a " 'mor e p erfect Union.' . . .  [Additionall y, t]h e Articl es of 
Confed eration claim ed 'to b e  p erp etual,' and a mor e temporar y union 
could hardl y b e  consid er ed mor e p erfect than a p erman ent on e" 
(p. 86). On e could count er b y  noting that th e authors of th e 
Constitution d eclin ed to includ e th e word "p erp etual," which, in 
contrast, app ears s everal tim es in th e Articl es of Confed eration. 
P erhaps this d elib erat e omission r efl ect ed sh eepishn ess at th e fact that 
l ess than a d ecad e aft er entering into a "p erp etual" union, Am ericans 
dismantl ed that gov ernm ent to form anoth er, mor e p erfectl y d esign ed 
to promot e th e public good. Furth ermor e, Farb er's claim that a 
p erp etual political union is n ec essaril y "mor e p erfect" seems deepl y 
37. KONST. SSSR (Constitution (Fundamental Law)] art. 72 (U.S.S.R. 1977), available at 
http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/77cons03.html. 
38. Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, July 18, 2003, art. 1-59. 
39. Id. Comment on Article 1-59. It should be noted that some members of the body 
drafting the Constitution have opposed this provision. See, e.g. , Ernani Lopes & Manuel 
Lobo Antunes, Suggestion for amendment of Article 1-59, at http://european-convention.eu. 
int/Docs/Treaty/pdf/46/46_Artl%2059%20Lopes%20EN.pdf ("(W)e propose that this article 
be deleted. In our view, the nature of the Union is not compatible with such an exit 
clause."). 
40. See CONFEDERATE CONST. (1861), available at http://www.usconstitution.com/ 
ConfederateConstitution.htm. 
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Hobbesian in its preference for order - any political order - to the 
instability that may arise when people seek to improve their political 
condition. 
Farber also suggests that the Constitution's Supremacy Clause41 
weighs against a right of secession. As he persuasively notes, those 
defending the right of secession must read this clause with the proviso, 
"except an ordinance of secession" (p. 87). Yet one could argue, as in 
fact Farber does earlier, that " [s]ecessionist theory . . .  is not 
inconsistent with a qualified form of federal supremacy. Under this 
view, a state must fully comply with federal law so long as it remains in 
the Union, just as a citizen must comply with federal law or emigrate 
elsewhere" (p. 70) . Similarly, with respect to the Republican 
Guarantee Clause42 one could argue that the most natural reading of 
the clause is that the states, as long as they are part of the Union, must 
maintain a "republican" form. It is, moreover, doubtful that the 
Republican Guarantee Clause supplied any ammunition for an 
invasion of the South, given that the states that comprised the 
Confederacy were "republican" in form, at least as the framers of the 
Constitution understood the term. To be sure, slavery existed in the 
southern states, but it also existed in most of the states in 1787, which 
apparently did not disrupt the framers' belief - however jarring to the 
modem observer - that slavery and republicanism can co-exist. For 
that matter, Delaware was a slave state that remained in the Union, 
and Lincoln never abolished slavery there. 43 Indeed, the Republican 
Guarantee Clause might well cut in favor of a right of secession, for it 
suggests that the federal government does not have the authority to 
impose an undemocratic government on a state when the majority of 
its citizens have voted to secede. 44 
41. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("[T]he Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land .. . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding."). 
42. U.S. CONST. art. IV,§ 4, cl. 1. Lincoln stated: 
The Constitution provides, and all the States have accepted the provision, that "The United 
States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of government." But, if 
a State may lawfully go out of the Union, having done so, it may also discard the republican 
form of government; so that to prevent its going out is an indispensable means, to the end, of 
maintaining the guaranty mentioned; and when an end is lawful and obligatory, the 
indispensable means to it, are also lawful and obligatory. 
Lincoln, Message to Congress, supra note 3. 
43. The Emancipation Proclamation freed slaves only in the "States and parts of 
States . . .  in rebellion against the United States." See President Abraham Lincoln, 
Emancipation Proclamation (Jan. 1, 1863), available at http://www.founding.com/library/ 
lbody.cfm?id=328&parent=63. Thus it did not emancipate slaves in the Union states or in 
those portions of Confederate states that were by 1863 under Union control. 
44. One could question, as Lincoln did, whether a majority of voters in each of the 
Southern states really were in favor of secession. See Lincoln, Message to Congress, supra 
note 3 ("The border States, so called, were not uniform in their action; some of them being 
almost for the Union, while in others - as Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and 
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Farber also draws upon Article IV, section 3,45 which prohibits a 
state from carving out a new state within its borders, as a rejection of 
the "right of self-determination for localities" (p. 86). Indeed, if the 
secession argument rests at bottom on the principle of self­
determination, it is hard to see how a government founded on the 
consent of the governed can long endure; and it was in this respect 
that Lincoln was apt to equate the principle of secession with anarchy. 
If South Carolina can withdraw from the Union, can Charleston 
secede from South Carolina, and a neighborhood from Charleston, 
and a block from the neighborhood, until each individual sets himself 
up as his own sovereign? But this argument is not entirely true to the 
secessionist position, which emphasizes the special status of the states 
as independently sovereign prior to the Union. As Jefferson Davis 
argued, secession "is . . .  justified upon the basis that the States are 
sovereign. . . . [E]ach State is sovereign, and thus may reclaim the 
grants that it has made to any agent whomsoever."46 South Carolina 
thus stands in a different relation vis-a-vis the United States than 
Charleston to South Carolina. 
Having scoured the constitutional text for evidence against a right 
of secession, Farber then takes a peek at the ratification debates. 
There too the striking fact is the almost-total silence on the question. 
Farber unearths an interesting morsel to buttress the argument that 
the ratifiers of the Constitution assumed there was no right of 
secession reserved in the states (p. 88). In the ratification debate in 
New York, outnumbered Federalists were tempted to ratify the 
Constitution, contingent on Congress's holding another constitutional 
convention to consider amendments. Hamilton sought guidance from 
Madison, who responded that a "conditional ratification" was 
unacceptable: "The Constitution requires an adoption in toto, and for 
ever" (p. 88). Significantly, Hamilton read Madison's letter aloud at 
the convention, so there is some basis for imputing Madison's view -
"The Constitution requires an adoption in toto, and for ever" - to the 
narrow majority in New York that ratified the Constitution. 
This is just one incident, however, so it is unclear how much weight 
it should be accorded. Furthermore, Farber fails to note that three 
states included a proviso when ratifying the Constitution specifically 
reserving a power to terminate the constitutional project. Virginia's 
reservation, for example, provided: "The powers granted under the 
Arkansas - the Union sentiment was nearly repressed and silenced."). And, of course, one 
could further note that a proper tabulation of the relevant voting pool in each of the 
seceding states should have included women and slaves. 
45. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 ("[N]o new States shall be formed or erected within 
the Jurisdiction of any other State . . . .  "). 
46. MARSHALL L. DEROSA, THE CONFEDERATE CONSTITUTION OF 1861: AN INQUIRY 
INTO AMERICAN CONSITUTIONALISM 16-17 (1991) (quoting Jefferson Davis). 
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Constitution being derived from the people of the United States may 
be resumed by them whensoever the same shall be perverted to injury 
and oppression."47 To be sure, this "reservation" clause is best 
understood as an affirmation not of Virginia's right to secede, but of a 
right of rebellion retained by all Americans, consistent with basic 
Lockean theory and the Declaration of Independence. A right of 
rebellion means that one is prepared to put oneself at war with the 
sovereign, with all the attendant consequences, if he threatens your 
life or property. Secession theory posits, to the contrary, a peaceful 
exit option in which a majority in one region can withdraw from the 
Union, and the rest of the Union must submit to its dissolution 
without resort to violence. Though the two are distinct, modern-day 
neo-secessionists and Lincoln detractors sometimes conflate them.48 
That said, it remains noteworthy that three states saw fit to emphasize 
the right of rebellion when ratifying the Constitution; and it is at least 
possible, especially when one recalls just how narrow the votes in 
favor of ratification were in several states, that the median voter at the 
time had a confused sense that individual states retained something 
like a right of withdrawal or secession. 
In this vein, a provocative essay by James Ostrowski poses the 
following thought experiment. Imagine that the Constitution included 
an Article VIII, which provided: 
Section 1. No State may ever secede from the Union for any reason, 
except by an amendment pursuant to Article V. 
Section 2. If any State attempts to secede without authorization, the 
Federal Government shall invade such State with sufficient military force 
to suppress the attempted secession. 
Section 3. The Federal Government may require the militias of all states 
to join in the use of force against the seceding State. 
Section 4. After suppressing said secession, the Federal Government 
shall rule said State by martial law until such time as said State shall 
accept permanent federal supremacy and alter its constitution to forbid 
future secessions.49 
47. Ratification of the Constitution by the State of Virginia (June 26, 1788), http://www. 
yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/const/ratva.htm. 
48. Harry Jaffa made this point strenuously in a debate with Thomas DiLorenzo. Harry 
V. Jaffa & Thomas J. DiLorenzo, The Real Abraham Lincoln: A Debate, Debate before the 
Independent Institute (May 7, 2002), at http://www.independent.org/tii/forums/020507ipf 
Trans.html. 
49. James Ostrowski, Was the Union Army's Invasion of the Confederate States a Lawful 
Act?: An Analysis of President Lincoln's Legal Arguments Against Secession, in SECESSION, 
STA TE & LIBERTY 178-79 (David Gordon ed., 2002). 
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For Lincoln, such an article was implicit in the U.S. Constitution. And 
yet, had such an article been explicit in 1787, one might wonder 
whether the Constitution would have been ratified. Would the 
marginal voter have been deterred by the presence of such an article 
explicitly foreclosing secession and laying out the consequences to a 
state that asserted such a right? 
On the other hand, as Farber notes, Lincoln's predecessor, James 
Buchanan, coined an almost equally persuasive thought experiment in 
rejecting a constitutional right of secession. Assume, Buchanan 
argued, that the Constitution had included an implicit right of 
secession. If so, surely the defenders of the Constitution, in the midst 
of heated ratification debates, would have noted this to defuse 
criticism: "What a crushing argument," Buchanan argued, "this 
[would] have proved against those who dreaded that the rights of the 
States would be endangered by the Constitution" (p. 88). Although 
Buchanan's argument has been seconded enthusiastically by Akhil 
Amar,50 one could easily tum the tables on Buchanan and Amar and 
ask: why did the Federalists not state clearly that there was no such 
right of secession, especially if, as Amar argues, " [o]ne of the 
Federalists' paramount goals was to constitute their new system in a 
way that would give no color to later state claims of a right to 
secede?"51 The answer may be that the Federalists assumed that they 
would lose critical support were they to insistently spell out their 
intention - an intention that was likely obvious to sensible observers 
- that the ratification was indeed "in toto and for ever." As Thomas 
Macaulay has written of the English constitutional settlement of 1689: 
the statesmen responsible for the settlement "cared little whether their 
major [premise] agreed with their conclusion if their major secured 
two hundred votes, and the conclusion two hundred more."52 
D. Secession as Rebellion and the Power of Coercion 
In Chapter Six, Farber turns to the question of whether, apart from 
legal considerations, the South could assert what Locke called a "right 
of rebellion." Even if we conclude that the Constitution does not 
authorize secession, one could argue that any nation "conceived," as 
Lincoln would say, by the Declaration of Independence, could not 
50. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1462 
n.162 (1987) ("The strongest historical evidence against secession, however, was not what 
the Federalists said but what they did not say. To my knowledge, no major proponent of the 
Constitution sought to win over states' rightists by conceding that states could unilaterally 
nullify or secede."). 
51. Id. 
52. THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY, HISTORY OF ENGLAND Vol. II, 438 (N.Y.: Am. 
News Co.). 
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permanently foreclose withdrawal.53 Yet Lincoln announced in his 
July 4 special address: "I hold that, in contemplation of universal law 
and of the Constitution, the Union of these States is perpetual. 
Perpetuity is implied, if not expressed, in the fundamental law of all 
national governments." Whenever a politician, even one as justly 
celebrated as Lincoln, references a "universal law," one is advised -
at a minimum - to clutch one's wallet: Precisely what universal law 
did Lincoln have in mind that justifies subservience to a government 
that a segment of the population no longer deems legitimate? What 
makes Lincoln's invocation of a "universal law" in 1861 initially 
puzzling is not only his famous and oft-repeated admiration for the 
Declaration of Independence, but also Lincoln's own words as a 
member of Congress during the Mexican-American War. Then, as 
Farber notes, Lincoln said: 
Any people anywhere . . .  being inclined and having the power, have the 
right to rise up, and shake off the existing government, and form a new 
one that suits them better . . . .  Any portion of such people that can, may 
revolutionize, and make their own, of so much of the territory as they 
inhabit. (p. 106) 
According to Jefferson Davis, the southern states "merely asserted the 
right which the Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776, defined 
to be 'inalienable' " (p. 101). 
Farber considers "the Southern grievances that might justify a 
right to revolution" (p. 102), and finds them wanting. After dismissing 
the tariff controversy as a mere "irritant," Farber concludes that 
slavery was the central issue separating South and North (pp. 102-05). 
In the words of a leading historian on the Civil War, "What were these 
rights and liberties for which Confederates contended? The right to 
own slaves; the liberty to take this property into the territories; 
freedom from the coercive powers of a centralized government. " 54  
Judged by the standards of contemporary international law, the 
South's claims of "self-determination," would, Farber argues, not fare 
well. He considers a recent opinion of the Canadian Supreme Court 
assessing Quebec's right to secede, and identifies three principal 
criteria to be used when evaluating any peoples' claim to sever ties 
with an existing government: is the people seeking self-determination 
a colony subject to foreign subjugation; has the people unambiguously 
asserted its will to secede; and will the people protect the "rights of 
minorities."55 As Farber notes, the South cannot be seriously viewed 
53. As Farber notes, "Southerners who were skeptical of the constitutionality of 
secession frequently invoked the right of revolution instead." P. 101. 
54. JAMES MCPHERSON, BA TILE CRY OF FREEDOM 241 (1988). 
55. Pp. 110-12 (quoting Reference re: Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 264, 
267-73). 
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as a "colony," and even assuming its will to secede was unambiguous, 
it fails under the final criteria: " [whereas] the Canadian Supreme 
Court stressed that a seceding region must respect the rights of 
others . . .  a major purpose of Southern secession was to ensure that 
white Southerners could freely deprive blacks of fundamental human 
rights" (p. 111) .  
But one should recall that the Revolutionaries of 1776 did not have 
clean hands as far as slavery is concerned. They rebelled and promptly 
established a political union, one purpose of which was "to ensure that 
white southerners could freely deprive blacks of fundamental human 
rights." Should we say that the Revolution of 1776 was illegitimate? 
The first emancipation proclamation on American soil was issued not 
by Abraham Lincoln in 1863, but by the English governor of Virginia, 
Lord Dunmore, in 1775, who promised slaves their freedom if they 
joined the royalist cause. As a recent historian has tartly noted, " [i]t is 
not sufficient to say . . .  that slaves and Indians were denied the fruits 
of Independence. To a large extent, in 1776 and 1861, slaves and 
Indians - or more precisely, the Indians' land and the slaves' labor -
were the fruits of Independence."56 I do not want to press this thesis 
too far. The fact remains that although the Constitution permits 
slavery, it nonetheless avoids mention of the word, perhaps suggesting 
an element of shame; by contrast, the Confederate Constitution 
enthusiastically uses the word "slave" or some variant.57 
Again, it is difficult to view sympathetically the South's rebellion 
against the Union, entangled as its claims were with the cause of 
slavery. But what if the institution of slavery had not existed in the 
South, and the tariff to protect Northern manufactures had been the 
South's principal grievance? If the Revolutionaries of 1776 rebelled in 
part because of ill-gotten taxes, why couldn't the Confederacy in 1861? 
Or to return to the hypothetical introducing this review: Had 
Breckinridge won the election of 1860 and had seven states seceded, 
with the Boston Globe announcing that New England was "acting over 
again the history of the American Revolution of 1776,"58 would we be 
sympathetic to the cause of secession? 
56. WOODY HOLTON, FORCED FOUNDERS: INDIANS, DEBTORS, SLAVES AND THE 
MAKING OF THE REVOLUTION IN VIRGINIA (1999). 
57. See Paul Finkelman, The Founders and Slavery: Little Ventured, Little Gained, 13 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 413, 425-26 (2001) (noting that in drafting the Articles of 
Confederation, and subsequently the Constitution, the authors "used euphemistic language 
referring to slaves as 'other Persons,' " in part because Northern delegates, in the words of 
William Patterson of New Jersey, "had been ashamed to use the term 'Slaves' & had 
substituted a description"). Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (stating that representation 
and taxes for each state shall be based on the addition to the number of free persons "three­
fifths of all other Persons") (emphasis added), with CONFEDERATE CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 
(1861) (using verbatim language, except in the last phrase, where it states "three-fifths of all 
slaves") (emphasis added). 
58. P. 102 (quoting an editorial in the New Orleans Picayune) . 
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To answer questions of this sort, Farber might have found it 
productive to consider the Lockean underpinnings of the Declaration 
of Independence. For Locke, whenever the political authorities 
" endeavor to take away, and destroy the Property of the People, or to 
reduce them to Slavery under Arbitrary Power, they put themselves 
into a state of War with the People, who are thereupon absolved from 
any farther Obedience."59 Locke considers the objection that his 
teaching "lays a foundation for Rebellion,"ffi because "no Government 
will be able long to subsist, if the People may set up a new Legislative, 
whenever they take offense at the old one."61 But according to Locke, 
men are more cautious than that, often preferring to bear present ills 
than cast their fortunes on uncertain enterprises, and are inclined to 
resort to revolution only as a last resort.62 Locke then considers who 
shall judge whether the prince is using his prerogative properly in 
furtherance of the common good, or is transgressing the laws and 
imperiling the lives and property of the subjects. Locke's terse answer 
to this question is, " The People shall be Judge."63 And to the objection 
that this is to say that there is no judge at all, Locke persists: "{E]very 
Man is Judge for himself . . .  whether another hath put himself into a 
State of War with him."64 
What guidance does this provide? First, Locke apparently 
disagrees with Lincoln's claims that "the central idea of secession is 
the essence of anarchy."65 Locke seems to think that perpetuity is not 
implied in the fundamental law of all national governments," nor is 
there necessarily any danger in teaching men that revolution is always 
an option; for the fact remains that men are not promiscuously 
inclined to exercise such a right. Lincoln's emphasis on perpetuity is 
consistent with Madison's hope that the Constitution remain 
unchallenged, and thereby come to enjoy the "veneration which time 
bestows on every thing, and without which perhaps the wisest and 
freest governments would not possess the requisite stability."66 There 
is a value, at least in terms of stability, in enshrouding any regime's 
founding principles in a sacredness that numbs critical thought, and it 
59. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, in Two TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT 305, § 228, at 460-62 (rev. ed. 1963). 
60. Id. § 228. 
61. Id. § 223. 
62. Id. § 225 ("Great mistakes in the ruling part, many wrong and inconvenient Laws, 
and all the slips of human frailty will be born by the People, without mutiny or murmur."). 
63. Id. § 240. 
64. Id. § 241. 
65. Lincoln, First Inaugural, supra note 16; see also Lincoln, Message to Congress, supra 
note 3 ("The principle itself is one of disintegration."). 
66. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison). 
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is possible that Locke, and to a greater extent Jefferson, who spoke 
glowingly of a constitutional convention every twenty years, 
understated this fact. Second, Locke seems to suggest that, contra 
Farber, we cannot evaluate the claimed justifications for revolution. 
Fundamentally, it is not for another to second-guess whether one man 
thinks his life or property is threatened: he is the only judge. 
And yet it is unclear what, in the end, is achieved by an appeal to a 
right of revolution. One might consider the possibility that the South 
had a "right" to "rebel" and form its own government under some 
higher law, but the North was also perfectly within its constitutional 
rights to seek to preserve the Union, if it deemed it to be 
advantageous. To this possibility, one might respond that it makes no 
sense to speak of a "right" to secede unless a correlative duty is 
imposed on the remaining states to respect that right - that is, to 
acquiesce in the dismemberment of the Union. Yet where would such 
a duty come from, and what power would exist to punish those who 
disregard it? The revolutionaries of 1776 may well have had a "right" 
to form a new government, but George III was surely entitled to 
dispatch armies to preserve the Empire. Likewise, even assuming that 
the Confederate states had a "right" to rebel, can one fault Lincoln for 
seeking to preserve the country as it existed prior to his inauguration? 
The hard question is perhaps not whether George III and 
Abraham Lincoln had a legal right to suppress a rebellion; the ques­
tion is whether, as a prudential matter, they should have done so, even 
if we assume they possessed the requisite legal authority. Edmund 
Burke famously argued that George III would have been better 
advised to conciliate with the American revolutionaries than fight 
them; and Burke's name, not to mention the course of events, lends 
retrospective luster to this argument. Unfortunately, the man most 
closely associated with a prudential argument against suppressing the 
southern rebellion was Lincoln's predecessor, James Buchanan, widely 
dismissed by historians as among our nation's worst chief executives. 
Farber considers Buchanan's argument that, on the one hand, the 
South did not have a right to secede, but, on the other, the federal 
government did not have the legal authority to invade those states (pp. 
94-101). He concludes that Buchanan's argument falls flat.67 
67. Farber relies principally upon Article I, section 8, clause 15, which authorizes 
Congress to "call[] forth the Militia to . . .  suppress Insurrections." President Buchanan's 
Attorney General Black argued that this clause must be read in tandem with Article IV, 
section 4, which provides that the federal government "shall protect each of [the states] 
against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the 
Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence." Black concluded that ·absent 
some request from the state, the federal government could not call forth the militia. Farber 
counters that Black's argument erroneously assumed that "insurrection" in Article I and 
"domestic violence" in Article IV have identical meanings. Pp. 98-99. 
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But the prudential argument against an invasion should not be 
lightly dismissed. Given what Farber calls the "human price of 
coercion" (p. 93) ,  one might wonder whether it would be better if a 
president confronted by a substantial secession movement simply let 
the states go in peace. Farber considers this important issue in a few 
paragraphs (pp. 1 12-14), but statements of two former presidents 
provide additional guidance. In a letter in 1816, Thomas Jefferson 
mused that " [i]f any State in the Union will declare that it prefers 
separation [to a continuance in union] . . .  I have no hesitation in 
saying, 'Let us separate.' "68 John Quincy Adams elaborated on this 
view at a celebration for the fiftieth anniversary of Washington's 
inaugural in 1839: 
But the indissoluble link of union between the people of the several 
States of this confederated nation, is after all, not in the right, but in the 
heart. If the day should ever come, (may Heaven avert it,) when the 
affections of the people of these states shall be alienated from each 
other; when the fraternal spirit shall give way to cold indifference, or 
collision of interest shall fester into hatred, the bands of political 
-association will not long hold together parties no longer attracted by the 
magnetism of conciliated interests and kindly sympathies; and far better 
will it be for the people of the disunited states, to part in friendship from 
each other, than to be held together by constraint.69 
Neither Jefferson nor Adams suggested that states had a right, 
grounded in the Constitution or in the Declaration of Independence, 
to secede. Indeed, Adams specifically disclaimed a right of secession 
later in his inaugural speech: "In the calm hours of self-possession, the 
right of a state to nullify an act of Congress, is too absurd for 
argument, and too odious for discussion. The right of a state to secede 
from the union is equally disowned by the principles of the 
Declaration of Independence. "70 His point was simply that if the states 
should ever cease to be united by interest and opinion, the best 
outcome would be to split apart. Furthermore, there is evidence that 
this was precisely the view held by Framers such as James Madison, 
who at the Philadelphia Convention argued against a provision 
"authorizing an exertion of the force of the whole [against] a 
delinquent state." In his notes, Madison "observed that the more he 
reflected on the use of force, the more he doubted the practicability, 
the justice and the efficacy of it when applied to people collectively 
and not individually."71 
68. Letter from Jefferson to W. Crawford (June 20, 1816), quoted in Ostrowski, supra 
note 49, at 175 n.60. 
69. President John Adams, The Jubilee of the Constitution: A Discourse (Apr. 30, 
1839), http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/misc/1839-jub.htm. 
70. Id. 
71. JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 
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Why, then, questions of right and law aside, did Lincoln not simply 
let the South go in peace? According to Lincoln, the peaceful 
coexistence of North and South was not a realistic option. By 1 861, the 
assets of North and South were so interspersed that one party could 
not, as in a unilateral and no-fault divorce, simply opt out. Lincoln 
explained in the First Inaugural: 
Physically speaking, we cannot separate. We cannot remove our 
respective sections from each other, nor build an impassable wall 
between them. A husband and wife may be divorced, and go out of the 
presence, and beyond the reach of each other; but the different parts of 
our country cannot do this. They cannot but remain face to face; and 
intercourse, either amicable or hostile, must continue between them. 
Lincoln is correct that the North and South would remain face to face, 
but so what? Norway and Sweden remained face to face after the 
former seceded from the latter in 1905, and the two Scandinavian 
countries, stranded on the same peninsula, each with rich and 
belligerent histories, have yet to come to blows. Nor has it been 
deemed necessary to erect an "impassable wall between them." It has 
been, as the modern expression goes, an amicable divorce - they get 
along better separately than they did together. 
One difference between Norway's secession in 1905 and the 
South's in 1 861 is that Norway peacefully negotiated its independence, 
whereas the South initiated its assertion of self-rule with a flurry of 
cannon balls. Really, what do you expect when you shell a nation's 
fort - that it would lightly dismiss the incident and wish you bon 
voyage? It may not satisfy the legal casuists, but Farber's conclusion 
has a certain plausibility: " [O]ne fact is crucial. It was the Confederacy 
that fired the first shot. After that happened, war was inevitable, just 
as it would have been if the French or Russian military had sacked a 
U.S. fort" (p. 1 1 4). Yet we cannot quite leave it at that. The war fervor 
that erupted in the North after the firing on Fort Sumter surely made 
it likely that a war between the states would ensue, but whether it was 
inevitable, as Farber suggests, is another story. Tocqueville applauded 
President Washington for resisting the popular enthusiasm for war 
with England in the late eighteenth century,72 and it is at least 
conceivable that an energetic president, such as Lincoln, could have 
restrained the dogs of war. His decision not to do so must have been 
based not only on his legal judgment about secession, but also on his 
prudential view that, despite the great costs of war, the Union was 
worth preserving. 
REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON: MAY 31 (1787), at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/ 
debates/ 531.htm (last modified Aug. 2, 2004). 
72. See Tocqueville, supra note 36, at 218. 
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One must include among the costs of the war the damage arguably 
inflicted upon the Constitution itself. In order to defend the 
Constitution Lincoln often took actions that skirted the outermost 
boundaries, and possibly exceeded, his constitutional authority. Farber 
divides his analysis of Lincoln's respect for civil liberties into three 
parts: to what extent Lincoln exceeded his Article II powers and 
encroached on legislative authority (pp. 115-43); to what extent 
Lincoln unjustifiably violated "individual rights" (pp. 144-75); and to 
what extent Lincoln flouted "the rule of law," which Farber generally 
understands to mean judicial decisions (pp. 176-95). Farber's tripartite 
division, like that of the Roman Empire, has a grandeur to it but fails 
to achieve perfect harmony. For example, Farber omits any discussion 
of Lincoln's unilateral executive decision to suspend habeas corpus in 
the first section of his discussion (executive power), yet the issue arises 
in both the second (individual rights) and third (rule of law) sections 
(pp. 157-63, 188-92). I depart below from Farber's thematic plan of 
attack and adopt a chronological one, focusing first on Lincoln's 
actions at the outbreak of hostilities and then on the fate of civil 
liberties in the course of the war. 
A. July 4, 1861 Speech 
On April 12, 1861, Confederate forces laid siege to Fort Sumter. 
Three days later, Lincoln issued a proclamation summoning the 
militia, as well as calling for 75,000 additional troops "to re-possess the 
forts, places, and property which have been seized from the Union" 
(p. 1 17). On April 19, a mob in Baltimore attacked a Massachusetts 
regiment on the way to Washington, D.C. (p. 1 17). Lincoln suspended 
habeas corpus on the route between Philadelphia and Washington, 
ordered a blockade of the South, and authorized the Treasury to 
advance $2 million to New York financiers, who were to make 
payments to support the incipient war effort (p. 1 18). 
Given that the Constitution, directly or indirectly, vests Congress 
with the power to appropriate funds,73 call up troops,74 declare war,75 
and, in times of "rebellion and invasion," suspend habeas corpus,76 
73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 ("No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in 
consequence of Appropriations made by Law."). 
74. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 15 ("Congress shall have Power . . .  To provide for calling 
forth the Militia to execute the laws of the Union."). 
75. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 11 ("Congress shall have Power . . .  To declare War."). 
76 . U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall 
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public safety may 
require it."). 
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many of Lincoln's unilateral actions in 1861 have given rise to 
accusations that he exceeded the powers allocated to the executive by 
Article II. In his July 4, 1 861, special address to Congress, Lincoln 
divided his actions into three groups in terms of their legality. First, 
with respect to his decisions to call forth the militia and order a 
blockade, Lincoln announced, "So far, all was believed to be strictly 
legal."77 He provided no argument, apparently regarding these actions 
as self-evidently constitutional. Farber diligently fills in the details, and 
notes that in calling forth the militia, Lincoln could have found 
support in the Militia Acts of 1798 and 1802, which authorized the 
President to call forth the militia in times of insurrection (p. 132). The 
blockade proclamation arguably encroached upon the legislative 
power to declare war, but Lincoln apparently assumed that, as 
Commander-in-Chief, he could take defensive action in the event of 
actual hostilities prior to congressional authorization. Congress 
mooted the issue on July 13, 1 861, by formally approving Lincoln's 
blockade order, but the owners of three ships seized prior to July 13 
took their case to the Supreme Court, which e.ventually sided with 
Lincoln 5-4.78 Farber likewise exonerates Lincoln on this count, noting 
that the Constitution, as originally drafted, authorized Congress to 
"make war." According to Madison's notes on the Convention, the 
language was amended to "declare war" to leave "to the Executive the 
power to repel sudden attacks" (p. 142). 
Lincoln's second category of actions consisted of "calls . . .  for 
volunteers, to serve three years, unless sooner discharged; and also for 
large additions to the regular Army and Navy." 79 Of these, Lincoln 
said, "These measures, whether strictly legal or not, were ventured 
upon, under what appeared to be a popular demand, and a public 
necessity; trusting, then as now, that Congress would readily ratify 
them. It is believed that nothing has been done beyond the 
constitutional competency of Congress." 80 Lincoln thus conceded that 
he was on somewhat more doubtful legal grounds here, and it is 
significant that he deemed it necessary to seek congressional approval 
for the decision to enlarge the army and navy. Although 
acknowledging that such actions may have exceeded his Article II 
authority, Lincoln downplayed such violations as merely technical 
separation-of-powers matters. Lincoln invoked "popular demand" and 
"necessity" to justify an assumption not of dictatorial powers - that 
is, powers not entrusted to any branch of the federal government -
but rather of powers ordinarily wielded by the legislature. 
77. Lincoln, Message to Congress, supra note 3. 
78. Pp. 138-43; Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1863). 
79. Lincoln, Message to Congress, supra note 3. 
80. Id. 
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Farber judges Lincoln's unauthorized expansion of the regular 
army and the diversion of federal funds to the New York financiers to 
be "unconstitutional" (pp. 137, 149, 192). In reaching this conclusion, 
Farber finds that these actions fall within what Justice Jackson in his 
Steel Seizure concurrence called "presidential actions contrary to the 
expressed will of Congress. "81 Yet Congress had never expressly or 
impliedly prohibited Lincoln from taking such action. In his Steel 
Seizure concurrence, Jackson emphasized that Congress had 
extensively regulated the law of condemnation and seizure, so it was 
against that backdrop that he could conclude that Truman had acted 
contrary to Congress's will. Farber does not point to any congressional 
actions82 that indicated a congressional will to foreclose the 
disbursement of funds or expansion of the regular army.83 Indeed, 
Congress validated such actions on July 13, 1 861,  or almost 
immediately upon being called back into session. 
Although Farber finds Lincoln's diversion of funds and expansion 
of the army to be "unconstitutional," he adds that "it is difficult to 
condemn these actions too harshly" (p. 138). But this simply raises the 
question: Why would you necessarily want to condemn Lincoln for 
these deeds, regardless of their legality? As Farber notes, the situation 
in April 1 861 could not be more dire; and unlike the internment of 
Japanese Americans in 1942, it is difficult to question the military 
necessity of each of Lincoln's actions when hostilities erupted.84 If we 
assume that the Union was worth preserving, Lincoln's audacious 
actions in April 1 861 seem more worthy of praise than condemnation. 
One could respond, however, that the Union was worth preserving, 
but only at a certain price. There are marginally desirable objects one 
would decline to pay more than a pittance for; and even if we assume 
81. P. 136. Jackson distinguished among three kinds of presidential actions: first, those 
"pursuant to an express or implied authorization to Congress," which are presumptively 
constitutional; second, "[w]hen the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant 
or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone 
of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority"; and third those 
directly contrary to a congressional directive, such as Truman's seizure of the steel mills, 
which are presumptively unconstitutional. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
82. For example, the Boland Amendments, enacted between 1982 and 1986, tried to 
prevent the President from funding the Nicaraguan Contras. See Edwin B. Firmage & 
Joseph E. Wrona, The War Power, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1684, 1702 n.124 (1991) (book 
review). 
83. With respect to the appropriation of $2 million to New York financiers in April to 
support the war effort, Farber has seized upon a peccadillo that even the most vehement 
Lincoln critics, such as Thomas DiLorenzo, do not bother to include in his list of sins. 
84. For example, Farber notes with respect to the diversion of funds, "Lincoln bypassed 
normal government channels and used private citizens for these payments because he feared 
that much of the bureaucracy was disloyal, Washington being much more of a Southern 
town than it is today." P. 118. 
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that the Union is inestimably good, perhaps there is a price (in lives, 
liberty, and property) that would make its preservation undesirable.85 
Finally, we come to Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus. When 
the President suspended the writ on April 19, his immediate concern 
was to prevent Maryland from seceding, for he did not savor the 
prospect of a capital stranded in enemy territory. On May 25, troops 
imprisoned John Merryman, a lieutenant in a secessionist cavalry 
believed to be responsible for the destruction of bridges and telegraph 
wires. The following day, and again on May 28, Chief Justice Taney 
issued writs ordering General George Cadwalader at Fort McHenry to 
release Merryman. Taney directed that both writs be sent to Lincoln, 
in order that he might "fulfill his constitutional obligation, to take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed; to determine what measures he 
will take to cause the civil process of the United States to be respected 
and enforced."86 Lincoln refused to comply with Taney's orders. 
In his July 4, 1861 address to Congress, Lincoln presented a two­
fold defense of these actions. First, he emphasized that, given the 
exigencies he confronted, he was forced to choose between his 
overarching constitutional duty to "take care that the laws be 
enforced" and other narrower duties, such as according respect for 
habeas corpus protections. Simply put, the greater trumps the smaller: 
To state the question more directly, are all the laws, but one, to go 
unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be 
violated? Even in such a case, would not the official oath be broken, if 
the government should be overthrown, when it was believed that 
disregarding the single law, would tend to preserve it?87 
Yet after apparently conceding that he had violated one constitutional 
provision, albeit to fulfill another, Lincoln retracted the concession: 
"But it was not believed that this question [of whether to break one 
law or another] was presented. It was not believed that any law was 
violated. "88 Lincoln noted that the Constitution authorizes the 
suspension of the writ, and it is "silent as to which, or who, is to 
exercise the power; and as the provision was plainly made for a 
dangerous emergency."89 At this point, rather than making tiresome 
legal arguments (this was a war speech after all), he added, "No more 
85. But cf Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865) ("Fondly do we 
hope - fervently do we pray - that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away. 
Yet, if God wills that it continue, until all the wealth piled by the bond-man's two hundred 
and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the 
lash, shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so 
still it must be said 'the judgments of the Lord, are true and righteous altogether.' "). 
86. Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 153 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487). 
87. Lincoln, Message to Congress, supra note 3. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
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extended argument is now offered; as an opinion, at some length, will 
probably be presented by the Attorney General."90 
Farber judges Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus "on 
balance . . .  constitutionally appropriate" (p. 163) , but he relies on an 
argument ignored by Lincoln, at least in the July 4 address. Farber 
writes that Congress had enacted Militia Acts authorizing the presi­
dent to call forth the militia in areas of insurrection, albeit decades ago 
in 1798 and 1802; assuming Maryland was an area of insurrection, 
"Lincoln clearly would have been empowered [by the Militia Acts] to 
use deadly force to suppress the insurrection [and] the power to detain 
dangerous individuals goes along with the power to use deadly 
military force against them" (p. 162) . Farber also offers a few words in 
defense of Lincoln's technical argument that the Constitution does not 
directly state that Congress, rather than the President, has the power 
to suspend habeas corpus (pp. 160-62) . The stumbling block here, of 
course, is that the power to suspend habeas corpus is located in Article 
I, not Article II. If one takes the structure of the Constitution 
seriously, it is hard to see how the President can claim this power, and 
it is revealing that after a sentence or two on this argument, Lincoln 
pawned it off on his Attorney General, Edward Bates. 
Lincoln, great lawyer that he was, also left to Bates the thorny 
question of whether he had shirked his constitutional duty by flouting 
a judicial order to release Merryman. Bates soon emerged from the 
library with an opinion that, not surprisingly, gave a sweeping 
interpretation to executive power. Bates drew upon the sort of 
arguments made first in Federalist No. 49, and thereafter by Jefferson 
(pardoning those convicted under the Alien and Sedition Acts) and 
Jackson (vetoing the Bank), that the three co-ordinate federal 
branches each reserve the right to interpret the Constitution.91 In this 
respect, Professor Michael Paulson has coined the phrase "Merryman 
power" to refer to a purported executive power to independently 
interpret the Constitution and, if necessary, nullify an unconstitutional 
judicial decision.92 Yet Paulsen notes that Lincoln did not directly 
assert such a power in the July 4, 1 861, speech.93 
Id. 
90. Id. 
91. 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 74, 85 (1861). Bates wrote: 
If it be true, as I have assumed, that the President and the judiciary are co-ordinate 
departments of government, and the one not subordinate to the other, I do not understand 
how it can be legally possible for a judge to issue a command to the President to come before 
him ad subjiciendum - that is, to submit implicitly to his judgment - and, in case of 
disobedience, treat him as a criminal, in contempt of a superior authority, and punish him as 
for a misdemeanor, by fine and imprisonment. 
92. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous 
Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 81 (1993). But see John 0. McGinnis, 
Models of the Opinion Function of the Attorney General: A Normative, Descriptive, and 
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Lincoln's silence in the July speech contrasts with his explicit 
consideration of the binding effect of the Dred Scott decision in the 
First Inaugural in April. Then, Lincoln emphasized that he regarded 
Dred Scott as wrongly decided, but nonetheless stated, 
I do not forget the position assumed by some, that constitutional 
questions are to be decided by the Supreme Court, nor do I deny that 
such decisions must be binding in any case, upon the parties to a suit, as 
to the object of that suit, while they are also entitled to very high respect 
and consideration, in all parallel cases, by all other departments of the 
Government.94 
Lincoln contrasted the views of "some," who think "constitutional 
questions are to be decided by the Supreme Court," with his own view 
that "such decisions must be binding in any case upon the parties to a 
suit as to the object of that suit." Even under Lincoln's view, 
therefore, he would seem to be bound by Chief Justice Taney's order 
in the particular case of John Merryman, although remaining free to 
challenge Taney's argument in other cases. Lincoln's refusal to give 
effect to Taney's order in Ex Parte Merryman points to a broader 
understanding of executive power. 
B. Individual Rights During the War 
Turning to the war, Farber begins by considering the legality of 
Lincoln's declaration of military rule in the actual theater of war (the 
South and border areas) (pp. 146-52). When he turns to the issue of 
military trials in the North (pp. 163-70), Farber emphasizes that only a 
tiny minority of these trials were conducted far from the scene of war; 
and to the extent that generals violated civil liberties, Lincoln 
frequently interposed himself on behalf of the victims. Farber explores 
the military trial of one Confederate sympathizer, Lambdin Milligan, 
in 1864, but Lincoln's role here was tangential and, as Farber notes, he 
was poised to issue a pardon when John Wilkes Booth deprived him of 
the opportunity (p. 164). 
The episode that best captures Lincoln's approach towards civil 
liberties in wartime is the 1864 trial of the Ohio pacifist Clement 
Vallandigham, who was charged with making speeches that 
undermined the war effort (pp. 170-75). After briefly sketching 
Lincoln's argument (including the famous rhetorical question "Must I 
shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while I must not touch 
a hair of a wiley agitator who induces him to desert?"), Farber 
Historical Prolegomenon, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 375, 391-96 (1993) (criticizing Paulsen's 
argument). 
93. Paulsen, supra note 92, at 95. 
94. Lincoln, First Inaugural, supra note 16. 
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critiques Lincoln's actions by the standards of twentieth-century First 
Amendment jurisprudence. Farber ultimately casts doubt on the value 
of this retrospective enterprise.95 Indeed, it might have been more 
interesting to delve into the complicated facts of the Vallandigham 
case and lay out Lincoln's own understanding of the applicability of 
the First Amendment in wartime.96 
Protesting various civil rights violations, a group of New York 
Democrats wrote to Lincoln in 1863, and alleged that Vallandigham 
had been arrested for "no other reason than words addressed to a 
public meeting." Lincoln's response acknowledged that, had 
Vallandigham been arrested simply for "words addressed to a public 
meeting," then "I [would] concede that the arrest was wrong."97 
Turning to the broader question of civil liberties in wartime, Lincoln 
argued that the Constitution is not "the same, in cases of rebellion or 
invasion, involving the public safety, as it is in times of profound peace 
and public security."98 The Constitution itself draws a "distinction," 
Lincoln added, apparently referring to the clause authorizing the 
suspension of habeas corpus in times of "rebellion." He wrote, 
I can no more be persuaded that the Government can constitutionally 
take no strong measures in time of rebellion, because it can be shown 
that the same could not lawfully be taken in time of peace, than I can be 
persuaded that a particular drug is not good medicine for a sick man, 
because it can be shown not to be good for a well one.99 
Then Lincoln scoffed at the objection that, if stretched in times of 
crisis, the government will not revert to its original dimensions. Of 
course, Lincoln's optimism on this score is not universal; and it is the 
received wisdom dating back at least to Locke,100 and doubtless 
further, that a government once distended by a strong executive in 
time of emergency, never returns to its proper size.101 
95. "If the question is whether Lincoln acted in knowing violation of constitutional 
standards, it is hard to hold him responsible for failing to anticipate the views that the 
Supreme Court itself would not develop until many decades later." P. 173. 
96. A recent article thoughtfully explores the issue. Geoffrey R. Stone, Abraham 
Lincoln 's First Amendment, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (2003). 
97. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Erastus Corning and Others (June 12, 1863), in 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, 1859-1865, at 266 (Don E. Fehrenbacher 
ed., 1989). 
98. Id. at 267. 
99. Id. 
100. LOCKE, supra note 59, § 166 ("[T]he reigns of good princes have been always most 
dangerous to the liberties of their people."). 
101. But see Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 
STAN. L. REV. 605, 625 (2003) ("There just are no systematic trends in the history of civil 
liberties, no important ratchet-like mechanisms that cause repeated wars or emergencies to 
push civil liberties in one direction or another in any sustained fashion."). 
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One of the most interesting features of Lincoln's argument in his 
letter to the New York Democrats and in other writings is his 
insistence that all of his emergency acts were in a sense constitutional 
- that is, his claim that the "Government can constitutionally" take 
emergency measures. As Geoffrey Stone has argued in an article on 
the Vallandigham affair, Lincoln repeatedly claimed to find 
authorization for his actions in particular clauses of the Constitution, 
from the "Take Care" Clause to the Habeas Clause to the 
Commander-in-Chief Clause.102 One might counter that this is a mere 
formality, for these clauses could be construed to authorize nearly any 
action in the event of an emergency. Indeed, in practice one might 
wonder how different Lincoln's understanding of executive power was 
from that of Hamilton, who maintained that the Vesting Clause of 
Article II entrusts the executive with discretionary powers to meet any 
emergency.103 Or, for that matter, in practice, is Lincoln's argument 
different from Jefferson's defenses of executive power, in which he 
asserted the President need not obey the Constitution in exceptional 
circumstances, but can seek justification in " [t]he laws of necessity"?104 
Farber sorts through the various arguments concerning executive 
power, but as he aptly notes, theoretical differences seem to have a 
way of converging in practice (p. 129). A cynic might wonder whether 
the essential truth of the matter is that strong presidents do what they 
do and post hoc find rationalizations for their actions. The 
rationalizations may differ, but the actions all bespeak obedience to a 
higher law than the Constitution, that is, as Locke would say, the 
"fundamental law of nature and government, viz. that as much as may 
be all m embers of society are to be preserved."105 The different 
102. Stone, supra note 96, at 29 ("What impresses most about his handling of the 
Vallandigham affair was his persisting concern for harmonizing liberty and power through 
constitutional discourse and his unflinching insistence that 'the Constitution mattered.' "). 
Farber offers a somewhat different take: "Lincoln was not arguing for the legal power to 
take emergency actions contrary to statutory or constitutional mandates. Instead, his 
argument fit well within the classic liberal view of emergency power. While unlawful, his 
actions could be ratified by Congress if it chose to do so . .. .'' P. 194. 
103. For a discussion of Hamilton's writings, as the pseudonymous Pacificus, in defense 
of President Washington's Neutrality Proclamation, see Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential 
Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 701, 791-96. 
104. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810), in THOMAS 
JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 1231 (1984). Jefferson wrote: 
Id. 
A strict observance of the written laws is doubtless one of the high duties of a good 
citizen, but it is not the highest. The laws of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving 
our country when in danger, are of a higher obligation. To lose our country by a 
scrupulous adherence to written law, would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty, 
property and all those who are enjoying them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the end 
to the means. 
105. LOCKE, supra note 59, § 159. 
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articulated understandings of executive power of Washington, 
Hamilton, Jefferson, and Lincoln provide fodder for law professors to 
parse and puzzle over, but - bracing thought - is this largely an 
exercise in pointless semantics? Chief Justice Rehnquist apparently 
thinks so, for he has concluded that the study of "occasional 
presidential excesses and judicial restraint in wartime" is "very largely 
academic. There is no reason to think that future wartime presidents 
will act differently from Lincoln, Wilson, or Roosevelt. "106 Lincoln 
ignored Taney's order to release John Merryman, and did not even 
bother to supply an argument justifying this action. Yes, he ordered 
Attorney General Bates to manufacture something to appease the 
populace, like a Cesare Borgia dispatching a lieutenant to take the 
heat,107 but it is Lincoln's silence here that speaks volumes. He did 
what he perceived necessary. 
American presidents, before and after Lincoln, seem to have 
exercised what John Locke called "prerogative" - " [the] power [of 
the executive] to act according to discretion for the public good, 
without the prescription of the law and sometimes even against it."108 
Farber quite correctly notes that Lockean prerogative seems 
inconsistent with written constitutionalism {p. 128), but this 
inconsistency may well be embedded in the Constitution nonetheless. 
The American regime perhaps "constitutionalizes" a power to act 
outside the law, which calls to mind what Machiavelli called "virtu," or 
farther back still, what Aristotle terms "prudence," the ultimate virtue 
of a statesman that is not reducible to general laws.109 
Farber glimpses this fact in his conclusion, which emphasizes 
Lincoln's personal qualities. He writes, "It was Lincoln's character -
his ability, judgment, courage, and humanity - that brought the 
Union through the war with the Constitution intact" (p. 200). Of 
course, this assumes that Lincoln saved the Constitution, rather than 
destroyed it. If the Constitution was originally a voluntary association 
of separate sovereigns, then he illegally engrossed the nation in a war 
that claimed over six hundred thousand lives and destroyed the 
economy of much of the nation. We may add violations of civil 
liberties to his sins, although at that point it would be hard to plunge 
his reputation any farther into disgrace. On the other hand, if Lincoln 
was right that the Constitution foreclosed secession and authorized the 
use of force to suppress any such movement, the entire problem of 
106. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE 224 (1998). 
107. See, e.g., Machiavelli, The Prince, reprinted in THREE RENAISSANCE CLASSICS 1, 
31-36 (1953) (describing Ceasare Borgia's use of Remirro de Oreo). 
108. LOCKE, supra note 59, § 160. 
109. The argument is laid out with great subtlety in HARVEY C. MANSFIELD JR., 
TAMING THE PRINCE: THE AMBIVALENCE OF MODERN EXECUTIVE POWER (1989). 
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civil liberties needs to be re-gauged. As Richard Posner writes, "If the 
Constitution is not to be treated as a suicide pact, why should military 
exigencies not influence the scope of the constitutional rights that the 
Supreme Court has manufactured from the Constitution's vague 
provisions?"110 
My own view is that the founders did not think secession was a 
constitutional right, but also could not have imagined that the federal 
government under the Constitution they had created would be so 
strong and so motivated as to prevent one-third of the states from 
withdrawing and reconstituting a govemment. m I thus think it fair to 
say that Lincoln, through the Civil War, effected a shift in the nature 
of the regime. Lincoln himself anticipated that a Union victory in the 
Civil War would give rise to a " new birth of freedom,"112 and he 
essentially cast himself in the role of a founder. The principles on 
which the Lincolnian regime were to be founded were not quite iden­
tical to those of the original regime, for most importantly the scourge 
of slavery would be eliminated. In this respect, as well as in laying the 
framework for a decisive shift in the relative power of the state and 
Federal Governments, it is perhaps not quite correct to say, as Farber 
does, that Lincoln "saved" the Constitution: he transformed it. 
110. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 294 (2003). 
111. See supra text accompanying notes 69-71. 
112. President Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), available at 
http://www.fouding.com/library/lbody.cfm?id=329&parent=63 (emphasis added). 
